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Abstract 
The increased role for agribusiness and larger scale production in China’s 
agricultural system is limited by China’s severe lack of arable land. The 
Household Responsibility System provides farmers a measure of power, 
hampering agribusiness from acquiring land needed for expansion. Some 
Chinese companies have sought cheaper and often more accessible land 
in nearby regions, including Southeast Asia. While such investments have 
the potential to deliver benefits, including increased productivity, structural 
constraints such as weak land ownership and environmental laws, highly 
unequal distribution of land and underdevelopment of peasant organizations 
prevent many poorer farmers from benefiting from these investments.
Keywords: China, Southeast Asia, agriculture, land
JEL classification: F59, Q12, Q15, Q34
1. Introduction
China’s agriculture system is undergoing revolutionary changes, involving 
the increased role for agribusiness and larger scale of production. Based in 
part on their enduring household-based and land rights system that still serves 
as the backbone of China’s agrarian system, Chinese farmers have adopted 
a number of types of relationships with agribusiness and local governments. 
Each type of relationship, in turn, has had both positive and negative effects 
on the economic and social positions of Chinese farmers. Despite this 
diversity of forms, one constant factor undergirding these changes is China’s 
severe lack of arable land. As a result, agribusiness companies and even 
ordinary farmers are looking to poorer countries nearby as sources of cheaper 
land and expanded production. How do these profound changes in China’s 
agricultural system, especially the scale of agricultural production, affect 
China’s neighbours, especially ASEAN countries? 
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To understand this requires some background about China’s agriculture 
system. In the wake of the death of Chinese Communist Party Chairman 
Mao Zedong in 1978, China’s agricultural system, starting in the early 80s, 
shifted fundamentally away from communal farms toward small plots of 
land farmed by individual farming families. Under this system, actual land 
ownership was retained by the village collective. However, in most parts of 
China, individual rural households were allocated land usage rights, and given 
the right, for the first time in decades, to make all major farming decisions. 
The State supported the system by subsidizing inputs and other forms of 
support. Spurred by the combination of individual initiative and state support, 
the Household Responsibility System (HRS) worked for a time to increase 
production and enhance rural incomes (World Bank, 2001). Rural poverty 
plummeted, as hundreds of millions were lifted out of poverty. Despite the 
HRS’s success, however, one problem remained: these small-scale farms and 
subsistence farmers were not conducive to modernization. As the rest of China 
industrialized and modernized, the agriculture system was left behind.
By 1990, then Chinese supreme leader Deng Xiaoping articulated a vision 
of a modern agriculture sector. Today, due to the increased involvement of 
agribusiness and entrepreneurial farmers, this vision has come closer to a 
reality in some rural areas. The household-based, small-holding agricultural 
production system has in some areas been transformed into specialized, 
commercialized, vertically integrated, and larger-scale form of agricultural 
production. For example, Shouguang County in Shandong province boasts 
the largest vegetable production base and vegetable trading market in the 
country, with hundreds of long-haul trucks departing daily to ship vegetables 
to all corners of the country. The entire county’s farmland is covered with 
greenhouses for growing vegetables. Yunnan province’s Chenggong County, 
where agriculture has shifted entirely to commercial flower and vegetable 
production, now houses the largest flower trading and auction market in 
Asia, ships fresh cut flowers to markets in neighbouring Asian countries and 
the United States, and is projected to become in 10 to 15 years the biggest 
flower producer and exporter in Asia, if not in the world.1 These are but two 
examples of how China’s agribusinesses have rapidly expanded in scale, 
promoting productivity and expanding exports. 
At the same time, the HRS as an institution remains intact. While 
a number of forms of large-scale production have emerged in spite of 
the system, the HRS itself gives a measure of power to farmers, largely 
preventing agribusiness from acquiring all the land they need to continue 
expansion. Agribusiness firms we interviewed during fieldwork trips 
conducted in 2007 and 2009 expressed a desire to expand production and 
increase in scale. While China’s lack of skilled labour (paradoxical given 
China’s gigantic population) constrains to a certain extent the ability of 
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companies to achieve this, the primary barrier to expanding agricultural 
production bases is the lack of access to land. 
2. Land, Agricultural Production and Agribusiness in China
Farmland in China is controlled by farmers, but is not owned by them. The 
rural farmland allocated to rural households can be rented, but not sold. This 
fact has compelled many companies and entrepreneurs to form production 
bases on previously unproductive land that they themselves have opened up. 
Many companies must negotiate with Chinese farming households, forming 
relationships that allow increased scale production while also benefiting 
farmers. Still other companies, frustrated by the lack of available arable 
land in China, have sought cheaper and often more accessible land in nearby 
regions such as Southeast Asia (Zhang and Donaldson, 2010: 481).
The lack of arable land for farming is a problem not unique to China. 
Many foreign agribusiness firms, not just Chinese ones, have been making 
inroads into Southeast Asia for the same reasons. In spite of this, we expect 
that the way Chinese agribusiness firms operate and manage their businesses 
in Southeast Asia will be different from other foreign agribusiness firms, 
for two main reasons. First, Chinese agribusinesses, a significant number 
of which are state-owned enterprises, often receive strong backing from the 
Chinese government, which tilts the power balance in their favour when 
dealing with governments and other agents in the poorer parts of Southeast 
Asia, who may be pressured by political and diplomatic considerations to 
make significant concessions to their Chinese counterparts. Second, the 
burgeoning scale and volume of Chinese trade and investments with Southeast 
Asia have helped to consolidate China’s influence in the region. This may, 
in some ways, elevate Chinese firms to a more privileged status than the 
rest, which will in turn affect the way they do their business in Southeast 
Asia. Representatives of agribusiness encouraged a business environment 
and relationship with the government that is largely familiar and relatively 
easily navigated. The debated question of a possible Chinese hegemony in 
East and Southeast Asia justifies specific attention on government-backed 
Chinese firms.
Chinese agribusinesses looking to venture overseas find no lack of 
support within the Chinese government because of rising concerns about 
food security in recent years. Anxious about its need to satisfy the country’s 
growing demand for food, the Chinese government has been exploring ways 
to secure greater amounts of external food supplies. As the population steadily 
rises in affluence, domestic consumption has surged ahead of domestic 
supply. In 2005, China overtook the US as the world’s largest consumer of 
grain, meat, coal and steel. Although in terms of consumption on a per-capita 
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basis the US still dwarfs China, this gap is narrowing.2 This, combined with 
China’s off-again, on-again commitment to food self-sufficiency, explains 
China’s urgent attempts to augment its food production. 
What is more, China finds it increasingly difficult to satisfy the growing 
needs of its population through supplies within its own boundaries. The 
World Bank estimates that China’s domestic food production will continue 
to lag behind demand for the next decade, and that imports will be crucial 
in making up the shortfall (Table 1). Corn, wheat and soybeans are three 
main agricultural products in which China faces increasing shortages (Gale 
et al., 2004). China is already the world’s largest soybean importer, and 
over the next 10 years, the country is expected to account for 80 per cent 
of the world’s 27 million ton growth in soybean trade (US Department of 
Agriculture, 2008). Non-food agricultural commodities are also lacking. 
The total consumption of natural rubber in China, for example, was 2.13 
million tons in 2006, and yet domestic output of natural rubber was only 
533,100 tons that year, a mere quarter of the demand.3 The problem of 
shortfalls in domestic agricultural supply is exacerbated by the rapid loss 
of arable land in China, due to reforestation, industrialization, urbanization, 
natural disaster and environmental degradation (Fischer et al., 1996). This 
trend is accelerating. Between 2000 and 2005 alone, China recorded an 
astounding 6.16 million hectares loss in arable land, or an average of 1.23 
million hectares annually.4 At the end of 2008, the official Chinese figure for 
the total amount of arable land is 121.7 million hectares, dangerously close 
to the government’s red line of 120 million hectares needed to ensure food 
securities.5 China is scouring the world for the natural resources needed to 
feed its breakneck-paced economic growth. Securing agricultural resources 
is a part of this trend.
While China attempts to manage the shortfall in domestic agricultural 
output by purchasing imports from the global market, this option invariably 
brings problems of its own. Commodity prices, often vulnerable to external 
shocks, are highly volatile. In 2006, prices of wheat reached a 10-year high 
when a drought in Australia, the world’s third largest producer, dramatically 
Table 1 World Bank Estimates of China’s Food Demand (in million tons)
 
Year Production Demand Imports
2010 483 502 19
2020 568 600 32
Source: Heilig, 1999.
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affected the global supply.6 Prices of corn also mushroomed in the same 
period, due to the growth of ethanol as a source of alternative energy.7 
The Chinese government is acutely aware of the high political costs that 
are incurred when food prices are not kept in check. The series of violent 
food riots that erupted throughout the developing world in 2008 serves as a 
sobering reminder that the poor will sometimes take to the streets when food 
prices explode.8
3. the Zou Chu Qu Policy and Southeast Asia
In short, the Chinese government’s goal to secure stable supplies of food and 
the local agribusinesses’ ambition to acquire inexpensive foreign land has 
driven the urgency with which China is acting overseas. This has shaped the 
Chinese government’s policy of “Zou Chu Qu 走出去”, literally meaning 
“going out” or “going abroad”. In 2001, the policy was formally announced 
with the launching of China’s 10th five-year plan (2001-2005). In the 
subsequent years, Chinese outward FDI accelerated at breakneck speed, and 
by 2004, China had established 8,299 overseas enterprises and had more than 
US$15 billion cumulative FDI in over 150 countries (Cheng and Stough, 
2007). ASEAN has not been left out of this trend, bringing in US$336 million 
of China’s outward FDI in 2006, or nearly half of China’s outward FDI in 
Asia, excluding Hong Kong (Chen, 2009). More than one-third of China’s 
investment in ASEAN has gone to developing countries in the Greater 
Mekong Subregion (Lim, 2008). 
While the Chinese government frame “Zou Chu Qu” as a strategy to 
bolster Chinese outward foreign direct investments, many also see the policy 
as an active push for overseas land and natural resources acquisition. Through 
agricultural cooperation deals sealed with other governments, Chinese firms 
are able to gain access to farmland in exchange for Chinese technologies, 
training and infrastructure development funds (GRAIN, 2008). An example 
of such a deal would include the US$5 billion pledged by the China Africa 
Development Fund, a private equity fund whose shareholder is China 
Development Bank, to finance food and cash-crop production in the continent 
for the next 50 years.9
Likewise, in the less-developed regions of Southeast Asia, agriculture 
is one of the few sectors to attract Chinese capital. The Opium Replacement 
Special Fund established by China’s State Council in 2006 is an example 
of China’s “Going Out” strategy as manifested in the poorer countries of 
ASEAN. Under this special fund, RMB250 million (US$36.6 million) was 
set aside to provide subsidies for Chinese companies to invest in commercial 
farming in Laos and Myanmar. In 2007 alone, investments by these 
Chinese companies totalled RMB411 million (US$60.2 million), making up 
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approximately eight per cent of total FDI inflows to Laos and Myanmar for 
that year. By 2008, 102 companies in Yunnan helped to plant just over one 
million mu (one mu is ~0.1647 acres) of cash crops in these two countries.10 
Other large-scale Chinese investments come in the form of provincial 
initiatives, particularly from provinces bordering Southeast Asia. For instance, 
Yunnan’s provincial government has signed agreements with Laos, Myanmar 
and Cambodia on establishing agricultural technology model parks, and 
Guangxi’s government signed agreements with Quang Ninh Province of 
Vietnam on agricultural cooperation (Embassy of People’s Republic of China 
in India, 2008).
Chinese agricultural investors are attracted to ASEAN mainly for the 
availability of inexpensive, uncultivated land, close to China’s southwest 
border. Cambodia, for example, has 500,000 hectares of land with soil 
conditions ideal for growing rubber trees, and yet, as of 2007, only 75,000 
hectares had been used for that purpose.11 Likewise, land is abundant in 
Myanmar, with more than six million hectares of largely uncultivated 
land owned by the state (Asian Development Bank, 2009). Aside from the 
abundance of land, the low rental cost is another appealing factor to Chinese 
investors. Land rental in the northern part of Laos costs a mere RMB50 to 
100 (US$7.30 to US$14.60) per mu per season, nearly one-tenth the price 
of land directly across the border in China’s Xishuangbanna region (Shi, 
2008).
Given the right conditions, Southeast Asia’s developing countries benefit 
from the influx of Chinese agricultural investments in a number of ways. 
First, increasing production of agricultural products such as wheat and rice 
may help to push down prices of food and make them more affordable to 
lower-income consumers. It is estimated that the poor in Southeast Asia spend 
about 64 per cent of their income on food, and that a 15 per cent decrease 
in food prices is equivalent to a 10 per cent increase in income, a strong 
indication that lower food prices play an important role in poverty alleviation 
(Raitzer et al., 2009) While there are concerns that Chinese agribusinesses 
may be exporting much of the food back to China, the Chinese government 
has claimed that it is not using overseas land acquisition to boost domestic 
food security.12 Second, higher levels of investment in agricultural research 
helps to improve the resistance of crops against environmental shocks, hence 
reducing the volatility of agricultural supplies and food prices. Changes 
in food prices have severe implications for poverty reduction, since the 
poor are the ones who are least able to cope with dramatic changes in food 
prices. World Bank President Robert Zoellick estimated that surging food 
prices in 2008 could have resulted in “seven lost years” in the fight against 
worldwide poverty (CNN, 2008). Hence, it is important to not only increase 
the production of food, but also make output more stable and less susceptible 
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to unpredictable environmental changes. A “super green rice” project started 
by China and funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is an effort 
– lauded by some, criticized by others – towards such a goal. The US$18 
million project aims to develop new varieties of rice that can stand drought, 
flooding, cold weather, and toxic minerals such as salt and iron. These new 
varieties will then be delivered to small-scale farmers in Asia and Africa 
(Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2009). Third, while agricultural production in 
countries such as Laos and Cambodia used to be limited to subsistence-based 
farming, Chinese investments have helped to channel funds and technology 
to modernize and commercialize their agriculture sector, benefiting some. 
Commodities such as cassava, palm oil, corn and rubber are major sources 
of Chinese investments in the GMS. Fourth, investments in agricultural 
research aimed at improving the nutrient content of food-related products can 
aid in the reduction of malnutrition. Micronutrient deficiency is a persistent 
problem in several parts of Southeast Asia, such as Cambodia, where 44 per 
cent of the children under the age of five suffer from malnutrition (Cambodia 
Food Security and Nutrition, 2009). Agricultural research can help to tackle 
these problems by improving the accessibility of micronutrients (Raitzer et 
al., 2009).
While capital investments from China have the potential to bring about 
agricultural modernization and poverty reduction in the developing countries 
of ASEAN, the social and environmental costs that accompany such benefits 
are equally important. In Laos for example, the expansion of rubber production 
is linked directly to the growth in demand for rubber, much of it from China’s 
burgeoning automotive industry. Chinese entrepreneurs, joined by counterparts 
in Vietnam, Thai and Lao state-owned companies, have been authorized to 
grow rubber trees totalling 42,050 hectares in Laos. In the process small-scale 
farmers affected typically lose their farmland, according to news reports and 
non-government organizations. The farmers are compensated for their losses 
at “inconceivably low fee rates”, in part because the farmers themselves are 
left to negotiate on their own compensation from the company.13 In Cambodia, 
Chinese investments in the timber trade have been accused of massive illegal 
logging and deforestation, further exacerbating Cambodia’s rapid loss of 
native forests (Vutha and Jalilian, 2008). 
4. Debating the Benefits of Foreign Investment in Agriculture
Social scientists have long debated the effects of foreign investment on the 
development of the recipient country and the fate of that country’s poorest and 
most vulnerable. Many neoclassical economists and social scientists contend 
that such overseas investment and involvement will generally benefit recipient 
economies. While not denying the negative social effects that occur, such 
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scholars argue that such investment will create economic growth in general, 
as well as new opportunities for poor people. Moreover, social changes will 
shift the country’s traditional rural population into the modern urban sector. 
These forces of modernization will help develop the overall economy, and 
the nation as a whole will shift through several stages of growth until it 
ultimately reaches the status of a fully developed country. Thus, according to 
this “modernization” thesis, poor backward countries should accept foreign 
investment and trade, for this becomes a major force for the modernization 
of the entire country.
By contrast, other more critical scholars argue that foreign investment 
and trade causes more harm than good. Not only do poor people rarely benefit 
from the investment, but recipient countries rarely develop in the first place, 
at least not beyond the political elites living in the national capital. More 
powerful foreign actors usually have designs on the poorer target country’s 
raw materials, and typically invest in only those areas that facilitate its 
removing needed commodities from the country, exploiting in the meantime, 
that country’s often desperate workforce. These commodities fuel the 
further industrialization of the investor, which then exports more expensive 
completed goods made with the poorer country’s own commodities. While the 
political and economic elites of the capital city will tend to benefit, the vast 
majority of the population is left behind. This “dependency” view, a popular 
analytical approach in the 1960s and 1970s, has in recent decades lost favour, 
as the economies of those countries that closed their doors to investment and 
trade, and tried to industrialize on their own, floundered in comparison to 
more open counterparts.14 
Most governments in Southeast Asia encouraged by the World Bank 
and others (World Bank, 2009) are predisposed towards the modernization 
point of view, having witnessed how the four Asian tigers (Hong Kong, 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) rapidly evolved into highly developed 
economies through trade and economic liberalization – the Asian Financial 
Crisis notwithstanding. Hence, even as China has been cautiously regarded 
as an economic threat, most Southeast Asian nations simultaneously eagerly 
embrace China’s economic role in the region. Overall, economic ties between 
China and ASEAN are increasingly strong. In 2009, despite the global 
financial crisis, trade volume between the two partners exceeded US$230 
billion, raising expectations that ASEAN together will soon replace Japan as 
China’s third largest trading partner.15 The two trading partners also marked 
the beginning of 2010 with the establishment of the world’s largest free trade 
area, the China-ASEAN FTA, which covers a population of 1.9 billion people, 
and is the world’s third largest regional agreement in terms of economic 
value.16 Will the poorest and most disadvantaged in Southeast Asia stand to 
gain from this increased cooperation between the two emerging economies? 
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5. the Impact of Land Investments in Southeast Asia on Poor Farmers
Many contentious issues have emerged out of China’s agribusiness dealings 
in ASEAN, land expropriation being one of the most controversial. This is 
not unexpected given that land ownership has always been a highly sensitive 
issue in largely agrarian societies. Many such cases have risen. Opposition 
from Filipino farmers forced the cancellation of a deal made by the Philippine 
government to lease 1.2 million hectares of land to Chinese investors to grow 
rice. The agreements were forged between Philippines and China during the 
ASEAN Leaders Summit in 2007, but were suspended due to widespread fears 
among farmers that they might be displaced from their lands.17 International 
non-governmental organizations and human rights groups have lobbied to 
block such investment in overseas agricultural production, denouncing them 
as part of a “global land grab” scheme that only serves to exacerbate poverty 
in developing countries (GRAIN, 2008). 
The issue of land expropriation is especially salient in developing 
countries where land rights are not formally institutionalized, and where 
norms of land tenure security are weak. One indicator of land tenure security 
is the percentage of land parcels that are formally registered or certified, as 
land that is uncertified is more vulnerable to expropriation by the State. Table 
2 shows that land registration rates are dismal throughout most of Southeast 
Table 2 Registration of Land Parcels in Selected East Asian Countries
Country Number of  Number of Percentage Type of
 parcels  parcels  of parcels  documentation
 (million) registered registered 
  (million) or certified
Cambodia  4 0.5 13 Title 
China  300 – – Land use allocation,
  (estimated)    land grant, land 
    use contract (rural)
Indonesia  80 17 23 Title
Lao PDR  1.6 0.8* 50 Title
Philippines  25 >10 30 Deed or title 
Thailand  30 19 63 Title 
Vietnam  105 90 86 (90% of  Land use certificate
   rural, 15% 
   of urban) 
Notes: * Includes 200,000 titles and 600,000 temporary land use certificates. 
 – Not available.
Source:  World Bank, 2004, Table 2-1, p. 11.
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Asia’s developing countries. In Cambodia, Philippines and Indonesia, less 
than 50 per cent of land parcels are registered or certified.
Indigenous minorities living in the forested areas of Southeast Asia are 
often among the first to have their land expropriated. This is because in most 
parts of the region, recognition of land rights is confined to non-forested land. 
This is a prevalent phenomenon in former British colonies, as customary 
laws that recognized the land rights of the indigenous people were ignored 
or cancelled during the colonial era. With decolonization, most of the newly 
independent states continued to be guided by the same colonial land tenure 
policies that favoured the ruling elites and denied the indigenous population 
of their customary rights to land (Ngidang, 2005). Meanwhile, efforts to 
reform the system and institutionalize the rights of the minorities have been 
half-hearted. In Cambodia for example, the 2001 Cambodian Land Law grants 
legal recognition of collective land rights of indigenous communities, but as 
of 2004, not a single indigenous community received ownership titles to its 
collective property (NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2006). Formal recognition 
of customary rights have been repeatedly denied, despite the fact that these 
minority groups have settled and cultivated the land for many generations, and 
have even established whole towns or communities on what is misleadingly 
classified as “forest land” (Burns and Dalrymple, 2006). Such indigenous 
groups are particularly vulnerable to land expropriation when a sudden 
change in policy opens forested land to commercial development. In Laos for 
instance, village-managed landscapes have been demarcated as “degraded 
forest” available for commercial plantation developers (Barney, 2007). 
The absence of formal land titles often disadvantages rural dwellers 
when bargaining with Chinese firms during land disputes. In Cambodia, a 
forest concession covering seven communes in three districts was granted to 
a joint venture between Chinese plantation firm Wuzhishan and Cambodia 
pulp-and-paper producer Pheapimex. Due to the unregulated process of land 
allocation in Cambodia, a majority of the villagers affected by the concession 
do not possess any legal documentation proving ownership of their land. 
When Wuzhishan started its operations, these villagers were warned by the 
authorities that they were occupying the land illegally, and that unless they 
cultivate their land, they will risk losing the land to the company. Those who 
chose to cultivate their land had to pay taxes amounting to US$50 per hectare, 
a hefty sum for these largely subsistence farmers. Without the legal protection 
that formal land titles would have granted, there was little the villagers 
could do to prevent the firm from taking away their land (World Rainforest 
Movement, 2005). 
The underlying cause of the problem is the hierarchical nature of the 
land concession granting process that lacks transparency and is thus suscep-
tible to corruption and collusion. In countries such as Laos and Cambodia, 
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concessions have been awarded without environmental and social impact 
studies, without a transparent process, without consultation with the local 
people, and many times, in ways that apparently violate existing land 
laws. The prime minister personally backed Cambodia’s land concession 
to Wuzhishan, despite being a transfer 20 times larger than that permitted 
by law. Commune councillors who were subsequently directed by the 
provincial authorities to sign their approval had little choice but to follow 
their leaders’ orders (World Rainforest Movement, 2005). In the case of 
Chinese rubber investors in Laos, the contracts concluded at the provincial or 
higher levels often become “a tool of negotiation and coercion at the lower 
level”. If villagers resisted, governmental authorities, even the armed forces, 
sometimes working in collaboration with Chinese investors, may be used 
to enforce compliance. In such cases, villagers have few options but to sell 
their land or abandon their land use rights. One study of Laos and Cambodia 
highlighted several other weaknesses with the concession granting process in 
both countries. These include an unclear division of responsibilities between 
national and provincial authorities, inadequate land-use planning at a macro 
level, a blatant disregard for the results of land-use planning processes at 
the local level, a lack of formal review (or an ineffective implementation of) 
processes for large-scale concessions, little cooperation between agencies with 
overlapping responsibilities, and state representatives who are often complicit 
in allowing land seizures that hurt poor farmers (Shi, 2008; WWF MPO and 
WWF GMPO, 2007). 
Even if small farmers’ land rights were fully protected, many other 
problems work against their interests. A second issue is the degree to which 
small-scale farmers are able to exploit the benefits of increased Chinese 
investments in agriculture. As mentioned elsewhere, most research findings 
argue that participating in contract farming with foreign or local investors 
bring about a range of benefits, such as increase in income, better access 
to technologies and credit, higher yields and better prices for their goods 
(Bijman, 2008). However, there is much less consensus on whether small-
scale farmers have been included in these contracts, and whether they enjoy 
the same benefits as large-scale farmers. Depending on a number of factors, 
such as the type of agricultural product contracted, and the socioeconomic 
conditions of these farmers, small-scale farmers may be precluded from 
entering into contracts with agribusiness firms. 
To most small-scale farmers in Southeast Asia’s less-developed regions 
engaging in subsistence farming, a transition to commercialized farming bears 
inherent risks, such as the possibility that investors will pull out of the venture 
and leave farmers with cash crops that they cannot themselves consume or sell 
locally. The nature of contract farming also increases the risk that the farmers 
have to bear. For instance, they are not typically compensated for their labour, 
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which is considered an investment input by the farmers. Given that most of 
these farmers have low savings, few alternative incomes and poor access to 
social safeguards, uncompensated labour can be a major disincentive. For 
example, poor farmers tend to avoid the risky but potentially lucrative venture 
of tree contract farming. Poor households that enter into such contracts risk 
crippling cash flow problems due to fluctuating income, and are more likely 
to be heavily dependent on credit. Some face the additional risk of being 
thrown off their leased land if they are not able to pay for services charged to 
them by contractor, or keep up with their debt repayments (Baumann, 2000). 
Given the risk aversion of poor farmers throughout Southeast Asia, these risks 
sometimes prove to be too much for many poor farmers to bear.
Chinese investors also may shun working with small-scale farmers due 
to the prohibitive transaction costs needed to coordinate the activities of 
the farmers. Working with poor farmers is expensive, due to costs of credit, 
inputs, extension services, and collecting and grading the harvest (Key and 
Runsten, 1999). This is especially true in the case of the production of niche, 
high-value products, where quality is paramount, volume of supply needs to 
be consistent, and farming techniques must be carefully monitored to achieve 
the desired quality. Working with larger scale farmers lowers the contractor’s 
risk of producer default, as these farmers usually have more advanced skills 
and more resources available (Bijman, 2008).
To what extent do Chinese agricultural investments involve the growing 
of the crops that are considered “high-risk” to local small-scale farmers, and 
“high-value” to investors? High-risk crops are typically highly perishable, 
have long maturing periods, and require the use of expensive fixed-cost 
processing facilities that have low disposable value and cannot be used in 
other forms of production (Sartorius and Kirsten, 2007). High-value products 
are usually characterized by the specialized inputs needed to ensure quality, 
and the technical complexity of the production process. Many Chinese 
investors have largely engaged in the contracting of such crops, namely 
rubber and timber, two of the main commodities that Chinese agribusiness 
firms cultivate in the Greater Mekong Subregion countries of Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (Rutherford et al., 2008, WWF MPO and WWF 
GMPO, 2007). Rubber has a long maturation cycle of seven to eight years 
before it yields any income. This barrier has, for instance, deterred poorer 
villagers in the Luang Namtha province of Laos from entering into contract 
farming with Chinese investors (Shi, 2008). Similarly, timber cultivation, 
which requires access to technical advice and specific inputs, has been found 
to favour larger landholders with significant land, labour and capital endow-
ments, and are unlikely to benefit the poorest of poor (Baumann, 2000). 
To the extent that large-scale farmers are favoured as partners for contract 
farming with Chinese investors, and that small-scale farmers are systemically 
IJCS 2-2 combined text final 04-300   300 10/4/2011   12:50:06 PM
Transformation of China’s Agriculture System and Its Impact on Southeast Asia      301
marginalized, Chinese investments in agriculture exacerbate income disparities 
and stratification in the receiving regions. As farmers with larger landholdings 
see their earnings increase, they may be encouraged to expand their farmlands 
to increase production. This further augments the competition for cultivatable 
land. Vongkhamor et al. observes that the competition for land among 
farmers in Oudomxay and Luang Prabang provinces of Laos is “facilitating 
privatization of land”, and it is the more well-off households who are “taking 
advantage of the current privatization”. Those who are able to mobilize 
capital and labour and have the ability to negotiate with local authorities, 
often have the upper hand in terms of claiming more productive land. Fujita 
et al. (2006) also points out that conversion of land into permanent rubber 
field “strengthens private ownership land”, which provides wealthier farmers 
an added incentive to expand the size of their landholdings. In their report 
on land use transformation in Northern Laos, other researchers documented 
cases in which productive land was converted into rubber fields under the 
name of village and local leaders (Fujita, 2007; Fujita et al., 2006; Phanvilay 
et al., 2006). Thus, the benefits of such crops appear to mainly accrue to the 
wealthier of the villagers.
Third, even if small-scale farmers do manage to establish partnership 
deals with Chinese investors, uncertainty persists about whether the farmers 
have sufficient leverage to bargain for contractual terms that are fair and 
non-exploitative. Large investors are endowed with a wealth of resources, 
have better access to market information, and usually wield monopolistic 
powers in the regions in which they have ventures. In some parts of Laos 
where Chinese investors operate, for instance, there are no sources of 
market information on rubber other than the ones provided by the Chinese 
themselves. Given the unequal power relations between the investors and 
smallholders, investors may manipulate the contractual terms to their own 
advantage, thus entitling themselves to a disproportionate share of the gains. 
The low education levels of most farmers in the remote parts of Southeast 
Asia renders them even more vulnerable to such exploitation. In Northern 
Laos, for example, contracts between Chinese investors and local farmers 
are written in Lao or Chinese, neither of which is typically the language 
used by highlanders. Contractual terms may also be vague or contradictory, 
potentially giving investors the opportunity to claim ownership over the 
farmers’ lands (Cohen, 2009). 
Governments can play a role in checking the often disproportionate 
powers of agribusiness firms by enacting competition policies, introducing 
special contract laws, providing low cost arbitration mechanisms, and 
improving accessibility to market information (Bijman, 2008). However, 
oftentimes the governments of most of Southeast Asia’s most impoverished 
countries lack the capacity or political will to advance and enforce such 
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policies. In addition, many of the government officials themselves have 
personal vested interests in helping the Chinese investors secure their 
contracts. In Buakkhu, Laos, for example, the official contract between the 
investors and villagers allocated 60 per cent of the profits to the investors and 
40 per cent to the villagers. However, it was subsequently discovered that an 
informal addendum was added to the official contract, distributing half of the 
villagers’ share of profits directly to the district government (Shi, 2008). 
Some scholars suggest that civil society can fill the void left by govern-
ment in protecting the interests of poor farmers (Prowse, 2007; Little and 
Watts, 1994; Runsten and Key, 1996). Small-scale farmers can organize 
into farming associations or producer organizations that can help to improve 
farmers’ access to market information, credit, technology and training, hence 
reducing the latter’s dependence on the agribusiness firms to provide such 
inputs. Such groups are also potentially in a stronger position to negotiate 
for better contractual terms with the investors (Sartorius and Kirsten, 2007). 
However, the formation of such farming associations requires consider-
able political, economic and social resources. Without assistance from the 
government, international organizations or non-government organizations, 
it is difficult for these associations to take root indigenously. Mekong 
governments often repress independent groups, fearing the creation of a public 
space that they cannot control. In Cambodia, NGO workers have noted that 
the government’s attitude toward local NGOs is “more of suspicion than 
cooperation”, and that governmental support rendered to NGOs has been 
dismally inadequate (Pednekar, 1995). Currently, Cambodian President Hun 
Sen is pushing for a new “NGO Law” that would require NGOs working in 
Cambodia to complete a complex registration process and submit to stringent 
financial reporting requirements (Asian Philanthropy Forum, 2008), a move 
which many NGOs perceive as a repressive tactic to keep the civil society 
under tight reins.18
Fourth, the disturbing trend towards increasing land inequalities and 
landlessness in the Mekong region imply that fewer farmers are able to 
reap the benefits from foreign agribusiness ventures. A study conducted 
in six villages in Cambodia revealed that “despite a relatively egalitarian 
distribution of agricultural lands in the late 1980s, considerable inequality in 
land holdings and landlessness has emerged through the last decade” (Sedara 
et al., 2002). Vietnam’s Mekong Delta region has also displayed a rapid 
increase in landlessness among the rural poor, where the poorest quintile of 
the population that was landless surged from 26 per cent in 2001 to 39 per 
cent in 2003. According to the 2002 Vietnam Living Household Standard 
Survey, 31 per cent of the poor in the Mekong Delta have no land, and 16 
per cent have less than 2,500 sq m, the level below which the Bank for the 
Poor classifies households as having “little land” (Cuong et al., 2006). A few 
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factors contribute to the prevalence of landlessness and near-landlessness: 
(1) distressed selling of land to pay for emergency expenses such as medical 
costs (Sedara et al., 2002), (2) use of land to service debt borrowed at 
exorbitantly high interest rates (Sovannarith et al., 2001), (3) rapid popula-
tion growth which has led to further fragmentation of land (Biddulph, 2000), 
(4) speculative activities causing upward pressure land prices and making it 
harder for farmers to buy land (Sovannarith et al., 2001).
Where local villagers are too land-poor to engage in contract farming with 
the Chinese investors, employment becomes the only potential benefit they 
might gain from the Chinese investments. However, in the case of Chinese 
timber investments in Cambodia, there have also been numerous reported 
cases of poor working conditions and inadequate remunerations provided by 
the employers. Workers hired by the Wuzhishan firm endured squalid living 
conditions, as basic accommodation was not provided. Diseases associated 
with unclean water were rife, and those who were too sick to work were 
quickly dismissed. The firm also reneged on many other employment benefits 
that were required by law (World Rainforest Movement, 2005). 
Fifth, there have been concerns that this recent wave of Chinese-led 
commercialization of agriculture in Southeast Asia have largely been left 
unmonitored, and hence may pose a serious threat to food security in the 
region. Most of these investments have been directed towards the production 
of non-food crops such as rubber and palm trees, which command higher 
selling prices on the market. Many of these developing countries in Southeast 
Asia into which Chinese investors are foraying face severe food shortages. 
Cambodia, for example, has some of the highest malnutrition rates in 
Asia, with 44 per cent of children under five years of age undernourished 
(Cambodia Food Security and Nutrition, 2009). In addition, in Laos, there 
have been complaints that the conversion of forests into rubber fields 
deprives the poor of forest food and products that are a traditional component 
of their diet (Fujita et al., 2006). As more farmers in these developing areas 
abandon subsistence farming for the growing of export-oriented, non-food 
crops, food supply shortages threaten to become more frequent and larger 
in scale. 
The more developed, industrialized countries in Southeast Asia also invest 
in agricultural production in neighbouring countries, and are generally wary of 
competing investments from China, as an influx of Chinese investments may 
potentially drive up prices of agricultural land and resources overseas. For 
this reason, food security is a top priority especially for net food-importing 
countries like Singapore. On 31st July 2009, Singapore’s National Develop-
ment Minister Mah Bow Tan announced that the government is encouraging 
local agribusiness firms to “work with farms overseas to ensure that Singapore 
has a ready and stable supply of produce”. The island-state is not the only 
IJCS 2-2 combined text final 04-303   303 10/4/2011   12:50:06 PM
304      Phoebe Luo Mingxuan, John A. Donaldson and Qian Forrest Zhang  
country in ASEAN to pursue such policies, as several other countries in the 
region, including Malaysia and Indonesia, are also net food-importing (Ng and 
Aksoy, 2008). The failure to control food supplies and food prices has serious 
political and social ramifications, as exemplified by the violent food riots in 
2008 sparked by soaring soybean prices that unsettled Indonesia.19 
Sixth, economic development in rural areas often comes with environ-
mental costs, and the case of Chinese agricultural investments in Southeast 
Asia is no exception. In the uplands of China, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Myanmar, more than 500,000 hectares of land have been 
converted to rubber fields. It is projected that the area of land dedicated 
to rubber and other diversified farming systems could more than double 
or triple by 2050, “largely by replacing lands now occupied by evergreen 
broadleaf trees and swidden-related secondary vegetation” – or put simply, 
by deforestation. However, deforestation is not the only undesirable outcome. 
Rubber planting as a form of monoculture agriculture system reduces 
biodiversity, and is linked to a myriad of environmental problems such 
as soil erosion. There are also similar concerns that conversion of forests 
to timber plantations in Cambodia are likely to result in the extinction of 
numerous species of plants (World Rainforest Movement, 2005). Despite the 
detrimental effect on the environment, rubber and timber cultivation have 
been largely promoted because they are regarded as equivalent to reforestation 
under the Chinese governmental policies (Cohen, 2009; Ziegler et al., 2009). 
Other business activities undertaken by the agribusiness firms, not just the 
cultivation of crops, may also have adverse impact on the environment. In 
the village of Ksach L’eath in Cambodia, the local irrigation system bringing 
water to the village was disrupted by Wuzhishan when it built dams on two 
streams in order to fill reservoirs for the nurseries and plantations. Alternative 
sources of quality water were not made available to the villagers when such 
disruptions occurred (World Rainforest Movement, 2005). 
6. Conclusions
In sum, the political forces behind issues that on the surface seem to be 
voluntary exchanges, must be scrutinized. The investment of Chinese 
agribusiness, encouraged by the State, is no different. Six serious concerns – 
land expropriation, the degree to which small farmers can benefit, the fairness 
of the business transactions, the exacerbation of land inequality, food security 
and the environmental impact – have emerged from increased investment in 
agriculture. These do not include other related topics, such as the safety of 
food imported from China, that have emerged from the economic relationships 
regarding agriculture. In many cases, the countries themselves have benefited 
from Chinese and other forms of investment. Overall, however, Chinese 
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investment has to some degree harmed the interest of poor and vulnerable 
Southeast Asian farmers. 
This does not imply that Southeast Asia should close its doors to all 
investment opportunities offered by China. It would, however, take much 
political will, tenacity and ingenuity to ensure that the local farmers and 
villagers, who have their livelihoods affected by these investments, are not 
denied of their rightful share of the gains that could be attained. A number 
of policies have been identified by analysts and researchers as crucial in 
achieving this goal. First, there is an urgent need to accelerate the land titling 
process and build up the capacities of relevant land administration agencies, in 
order to effectively tackle the problem of land expropriation. Second, a more 
secure social safety net should be constructed and would reduce the risk of 
engaging in contract farming, encouraging more poor farmers to enter into 
such agreements. Contract farming and other forms of risk would increase 
the diversity of the local economy to provide alternative sources of income, 
so as to avoid excessive reliance on profits from contract farming alone. 
Third, to level the playing field between investors and smallholders, credit 
provision and technical assistance should be extended to poorer households, 
and reliable and timely market information should be made widely available. 
Fourth, stricter monitoring of the firms’ operations and activities would have 
to be enforced to address the problems of human rights abuses and violations 
of environmental regulations (Balisacan, 2005; Shi, 2008). Finally, the 
countries can adopt the Chinese practice of attracting conditions to investment 
– conditions that help promote farmers’ interests.
Yet each of these suggestions assumes conditions that are rarely found 
in Mekong countries, where contracts are selectively enforced, rule of law is 
weak, and farmers have little representation. Thus, modernization theorists 
are often too sanguine about the trickle-down effect of economic growth and 
liberalization, ignoring the various inequalities in power that impede a fairer 
distribution of benefits and costs among the stakeholders. Moreover conditions 
for these kinds of policy approaches are worsening as China’s economic and 
political influence in Southeast Asia continues to accelerate. The potential for 
Chinese agribusinesses to contribute to poverty reduction in Southeast Asia is 
great, yet the region’s poor farmers are unlikely to benefit.
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